Chechen separatism was blurred into an image of Islamic terrorism and the Russian military operations in Chechnya in 1999 sent to deal with these groups were labelled as a 'police counter terrorist operation' and not a war.
The attempt to conflate internal Russian issues with international Islamic terrorism was re-enforced further following September 11 th . Putin was the first world leader to send his regards to President Bush, and Russia very actively offered its support to the US-led war on terror. In a statement Putin Unlike the first Chechen campaign which was said to be motivated by the need to restore constitutional order in the Republic, the second Chechen conflict centred on repelling the threat of international terrorists operating inside Chechnya. The Russian government claimed that, there were extensive links between Chechen separatists and other international terrorist Islamic organisations operating outside of Russia such the Al Queda groups in Afghanistan. Many stories in the official media emphasised the role of foreign fighters in Chechnya. For example, Rossiiskaya Gazeta suggested that two thirds of Chechen fighters were mercenaries, and gave detailed descriptions of the way that these foreign mercenaries paid Chechen boys between 10 to 100 dollars to lay down mines (Kozireva 2000; Lapsky 1999 ). The motivation of these foreign fighters seemed therefore to be numerous and diverse, but crucially they were not in any way related to the previous Chechen conflict in 1994-96 which centred on the question of secession and indigenous Chechen attempts to gain independence from Russia.
To the same end, Putin made a concerted effort to argue that this anti-terrorist police operation was not against Chechnya, Chechens, North Caucasus or even Russian Muslims. 9 As noted by Bacon, international terrorism was in fact presented as an existential threat not only to Russia but also to the survival of the Chechen nation and its economy (Bacon, et al 2006) . In this way, the threat posed by
Chechnya was thus presented not as stemming from within Russia but from external actors taking advantage of Russia's domestic weakness. In turn this had a direct reflection on policies aimed at the Chechen threat, which centred on non-negotiation with the terrorist groups, whilst making a concerted effort to promote a Russian-backed local Chechen leadership to facilitate a peaceful settlement.
c) Russia's external security priorities
International terrorism was portrayed as an existential threat to the global community. From this perspective, Russia's ongoing domestic fight against terrorism was said to be simultaneously ensuring the survival of international society. As noted by the Head of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Valery Manilov in September 2000: Those guys, killed in Chechnya, are defending the whole of
Europe from terrorism' (Kozyreva 2000) . This inter-linking between the internal and external environments was not confined exclusively to the communality of threats but also the approach to addressing this threat. The Russia government regularly suggested that the global community make a more of a concerted effort to develop a common approach to counter-terrorism. This was in evidence as early as 1999, and thus predated the launch of a similar rhetoric by US-led after 9/11. To this end, Russia initiated a series of UN resolutions aimed at security threats emanating from Afghanistan and the Al Queda terrorist cells located there in the late 1990s, early 2000s. In October 1999, Russia sponsored UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267, which threatened to impose sanctions on the Taliban, unless it surrendered Bin Laden. UNSC resolution 1333 reiterating these demands in December 2000. For Russia international terrorism thus came to represent a security threat operating in multiple parts of the world, and it fell to the international community to establish a united front to counter-act this global danger.
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In this way, the international sphere, particularly the West was increasingly presented in a more positive light and in less confrontational terms than in the immediate period following the NATO bombing of Serbia in the first half of 1999. As a result, Russia chose to place less emphasis on previously contentious issues of the late 1990s, such as NATO expansion (Morozov, 2004: 318 2000 -2001 link between Russia's problems in Chechnya and the US war on terror was an opportunistic move (Cornell, 2003:167-168) . Others characterise it as merely a smoke screen for what was really going on in Chechnya, or that it was purely a mechanism for restoring Russia's links with the West, following the break down of relations in the late 1990s. However, it is more accurate to characterise Putin as seeking to capitalise on the prevailing mood for a cooperative approach to terrorism to build ties with the West and the US in particular. Thus, although Putin's support for the US-led war against terrorism was to some degree a 'gamble', due to the long list of outstanding disputes between Russia and the West and the threat that such arrangements posed to Russia's other partnerships China, Iran, India, Central Asian influence (Antonenko, 2001-02:49) , this should be qualified.
Firstly, as already noted, Russia attempted to convince its Western partners to pay more attention to the issue of international terrorism even before 9/11, particularly in relation to its Southern borders including Afghanistan. Therefore, the US-led war on terror was partially interpreted as the West finally acknowledging an issue which Russia had been raising for some time before.
Secondly, rather than merely a smokes screen for its action in Chechnya, counter terrorism did in fact develop into a vehicle for cooperation between Russia and its international partners after 9/11, although less successfully than it was hoped at the time. On the bilateral level, Russia's most successful cooperation was with the US, as Russia shared America's vision for the war on terror, which Lieven conceptualises as 'an alliance between states for the protection of states' (Lieven 2002:249) . Therefore, the strategy of using international terrorism to build relations with the US and gain greater recognition of Russia's own domestic struggles with terrorism was to some degree a success. However, it had less impact on relations with Europe. Despite the muting of criticism of Russia immediately after 9/11, it re-emerged rather swiftly at the Russia-EU summits in 2002. Russia's European partners continued to make a distinction between Chechen rebels and Al Quaeda and insisted that it should negotiate with Chechen representatives, as was stated at the Russia-EU Brussels Summit of November 2002 (Herd, 2002: 118) . Similarly, the Council of Europe declined to send observers to the Chechen (Lynch, 2005: 150) . The threat of international terrorism and the need to counter act also became a mechanism for cooperation in non-Western multilateral organisation, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Thus, the Russian strategy of justifying its policy in Chechnya and building its great power status through international against terrorism following September 11 th was not an outright success but certainly achieved some of the expected aims.
To sum up Putin's first term in power: Russia presented itself as a weak power that was hoping to reassert itself as a strong domestic and international actor. However, this could not be achieved until its 15 These included Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs.
internal security threats were overcome. Thus, the impact of international terrorism on domestic security became one of the key referent threats to Russia's existence, and one of the key factors that was preventing Russia from fulfilling its ambition of regaining its 'true' identity as a strong state. At the same time, international terrorism was also presented as an existential threat to the rest of international community. In this period Russia sought to rejoin what it saw as an international community of strong states and international terrorism played a role in this as a source of cooperation between Russia and the other great powers. Thus, internal security issues were not only prioritised and securitised within the Russian official discourse, but were also directly intertwined with Russia's view of itself and its international outlook.
Section 2: Putin's late period and Russia's war on terror, 2006-2008
The spirit of cooperation and alliance building that emerged between Russia and the West in the aftermath of 9/11 was short lived. By Putin's second term, mutual suspicion and disappointment reemerged in Russian perceptions of the West, similar to those prevalent in the mid-1990s. A major source of this perception was that Russia believed it had successfully solved its internal problems, but that the international community continued to refuse its rightful place amongst other great powers. This led to a review of Russian security priorities.
a) Russia's state identity
By the mid-2000's official characterisations of Russia as a weak state, rife with internal and external security threats had disappeared. In its place, a new image of Russia as a strong state emerged. This was premised on Russia having resolved its internal challenges, whereby Russia was now a state for whom it main security concerns related to the external rather than internal sphere.
As part of the process of de-securitising internal security, a simultaneous process of externalisation of security along temporal, geographical and even normative axis was evident. On the temporal axis, there On this basis, the overall message from the Russian authorities was one of greater self-confidence. As part of its domestic strength Russia began to present itself as a great power in the international system, able to defend its position and interests, and who was no longer prepared to be sidelined in major international developments. As mentioned in a recent foreign policy appraisal: 'the firmness of the international positions of Russia directly hinges on the situation within the country. The internal strengthening of Russia makes our foreign policy more purposeful and productive, and Russian diplomacy increasingly relevant in world affairs ' (2008) . Therefore, Russia was ready to take its rightful place on the international arena among other great powers.
b) Russia's internal security priorities
The Russian internal sphere was characterised by the emergence of two, and at times interlinked and yet often independent, processes: the narrative of desecuritisation and the narrative of risk. its control over all non-state activity. As a result, a new conceptualization of threat has emerged which merges terrorism with independent activity and influences from the West. This was highlighted by Aleksandr Torshin, deputy chairman of the Federation Council and a member of the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC), when he stated that "Foreign NGOs often turn into platforms for recruiting terrorists and extremists. What is particularly alarming is that in most cases they recruit young people', he also suggested that foreign, especially European governments not only do not clamp down on such activity in their countries but operationalise the information disseminated by such NGOs for their own propaganda purposes.
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Thus in this period, a redefinition of internal security threats was evident, with a less specific and wider conception of challenges adopted. The common theme among these was that they were perceived to challenge the political authority of the regime, and usually represented as originating from non-state 22 According to an interview with the Minister of Interior, Rashid Nurgaliev, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta most of the terrorist activity no longer represents 'large scale and coordinated armed resistance. In recent times the presentation of the North Caucasus region has taken on a more general criminal direction', 26 The application of anti-terrorist and anti-extremist measures in tandem and ad hoc in practice is at the heart of the blurring of these two specific issues into a communality of threats around the notion of 'vrag'. Therefore, international terrorism was on the one hand downgraded to no longer presenting an existential threat, and on the other, placed within a wider construct of other potential security risks which threatened to derail the course of country's development in this period.
In this context, the threat of terrorism, as in the earlier period, continues to be employed for . Therefore, the Russian internal sphere has not been fully desecuritised within official discourse as it has become a potential source of instability. In this respect, international terrorism continues to play a key role, but has been subsumed within the wider image of the 'obraz vraga' that is threatening Russia from abroad but also from within.
c) Russia's external security priorities
In the minds of the Russian leadership, having regained the status of a strong state, it was expected that this would be recognised by the West. However, this acknowledgement was not perceived as overcoming, leading Putin to state that the return of a strong Russia is 'not to everyone's taste'. 28 This perception of being spurned by the West was a major factor in the Russian leaderships reconsideration of what the key referent threat to Russia and the international system is. In this respect, global terrorism gave way to the increasing threat emanating from the West and its domination of the international system at the expense of others (Trenin, 2006 to international groups and movements posing a threat to other states. For example within the framework of the SCO, Russia's concern with terrorism is focused on the threat to the regimes' of the Central Asian Republics rather than within its own borders 39 .
To sum up, international terrorism remains an important issue for Russia, but it is no longer the single most important one. As noted by President Medvedev in March 2009, the threat from international terrorism continues to be a priority for Russia; however it is now ranked also alongside the threat from NATO and other local crises, and is no longer the same level of priority from Russian political or military circles as in the previous period.
Concluding remarks
This paper set out to analyse the way in which notions of weak and strong state were played out in or security governance and more on Russia regaining international prestige and its political elites maintaining a tight control over the state. In many ways, even within this construct of a strong state there remains insecurity, both within the elites and in some ways the public, that Russia will not be taken seriously as a strong state, or that its fundamentals will be challenged. In this way, the internal sphere, whilst no longer presented as an existential threat, continues to be watched carefully by the elites as a potential 'risk', whilst in the external sphere Russia continues to feels challenged with regard to its international standing as a great power. An underlying logic of the traditional notion of a 'strong' state, which is often ignored, is that it designates a confident state. Confidence is something that still eludes the Russian elites, and perhaps explains the ongoing inter-linkage between internal and external security concerns, which makes Russia simultaneously a strong and a weak state. This represents a form of hybridisation between these two types of statehood.
Russia's narratives about weak and strong states challenge the assumptions that strong states have eliminated all internal security threats and managed to break the link between external and internal security concerns. As this articles has outlined, the change in Russian identity during the Putin Presidency emphasise the direct inter-relationship between internal and external security. Indeed, the realisation that internal and external security dimensions are inter-linked is now being acknowledged even by scholars studying what could be described as traditional strong states, especially those of Western Europe. Russia in this case provides an even more vivid and stark illustrative example of this interaction. In both the early and late periods of Russia under Putin, external security priorities, especially its relationship with the West and international terrorism, have had a marked impact on its construction of internal threats. It is not that one field, external or internal, dominates or more actively impacts on the other. Rather, internal and external security priorities, together with state identity are inter-linked processes. Therefore, Russia's relationship with the West, its policy towards the North Caucasus or its approaches towards the war on terror cannot be considered simply by examining either the external or the internal sphere. Nor can they be fully understood without contextualising these security realms within the wider sphere of state identity, and other political, social and economic policies.
